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As a component of the Department of Homeland Security and the department’s 
lead for maritime security, the Coast Guard is charged with executing the United States 
domestic maritime anti-terrorism program. It is critical that Coast Guard policy, plans, 
and tactics maintain pace with the ever-changing risks associated with terrorism.  
This thesis examines alternative analysis red teaming and its potential value to the 
Coast Guard. Specifically, it seeks to answer how red teaming can be leveraged to 
enhance the value of domestic maritime anti-terrorism activities. The research reviews 
elements of the maritime domain and principles of red teaming, and proposes and 
provides implementation recommendations for a terrorism red teaming program for the 
domestic maritime domain. 
The study revealed that a red team program would be value added to the Coast 
Guard for domestic maritime anti-terrorism programs. Leveraging the concept of a 
minimal viable program, the thesis proposes a red team program and strategy to 
implement the program within the U.S. Coast Guard. The suggested program would be 
comprised of three elements: physical red teaming, identification of future attack 
scenarios, and policy red teaming. The thesis further provides insight into the 
implementation of these programs and suggests a minimal viable program approach to 
establishing a terrorism red teaming program for the domestic maritime domain. 
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I. AN ARGUMENT FOR RED TEAMING IN THE DOMESTIC 
MARITIME DOMAIN 
A. INTRODUCTION  
 
What if we had a Red Team program for the Domestic Maritime Domain? 
 
At 8:15 AM tomorrow in New York City, a Staten Island ferry with over 4,000 
people onboard makes its way across the New York Harbor heading for Manhattan. Two 
Coast Guard boats are conducting patrols of the harbor and are close by as the ferry 
goes past the Statue of Liberty. Suddenly, a “swarm” of small drones, well over 1,000, 
come buzzing down from the sky, hitting passengers on deck and exploding on contact. 
The Coast Guard boats attempt to shoot down some of the drones but are only successful 
in bringing down a handful of the small, maneuverable drones. Fifty or so hit a side 
window of the ferry’s main deck, making a 4-foot hole; swarms of drones fly through the 
hole seeking additional passengers. Simultaneously, the same “swarm” happens to a 
bridge window, and kills the captain and crew piloting the vessel. The ferry veers off 
course and plows directly into the dock on Liberty Island, which is crowded with visitors 
who have just arrived to visit the Statue of Liberty. The entire attack is over in 10 
minutes, which leaves 1,800 dead on the ferry, and another 200 people on the dock at 
Liberty Island. 
Flashback to 2010: As part of a senior year capstone course of study, a Coast 
Guard Academy Cadet Future Scenario Red Team identifies drones/unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) as an emergent technology with new attack method applications within 
the domestic maritime domain. Several Cadets, familiar with model aircrafts and 
computer technology, propose that terrorists could, at some point, leverage the technical 
advances in these areas to attack large groups of people, undetected, from several miles 
away.  
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The team identifies potential terrorist uses for drones, and then develops potential 
attack scenarios based upon several terrorist organizations’ narratives. The team 
realizes that terrorists could leverage drones to conduct surveillance prior to and during 
an attack, to deliver small payloads including explosive charges, and to transport 
equipment and weapons past security screening areas. A similar Coast Guard Academy 
Cadet Attributes Red Team taking that information identifies some basic characteristics 
that drones could have in the immediate future: control systems, distances, and payload 
abilities, all linked back to the identified terrorist intents. The team conducts physical 
testing and gathers expert solicitation quantifying the potential abilities of terrorist 
leveraging drone technologies. 
Based on the information collected by the Coast Guard Academy teams, a Coast 
Guard Headquarters Policy Red Team conducts a review of Coast Guard policy 
guidance, operational plans, and tactics on hand to address such attack methods. The 
team identifies significant gaps in regulations, policy, operational plans, and tactics to 
counter drone use by terrorists. Based on these findings, a coordinated effort between the 
Coast Guard and the Federal Aviation Administration is launched resulting in laws and 
regulations that limit drone use in and around commercial seaports and near public 
beaches and other maritime recreational areas. The Coast Guard introduces laws 
empowering law enforcement to take action when identifying drone use in these restricted 
areas. 
Meanwhile, the Coast Guard research and development center and Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate launch a 3-year project 
to develop technologies to counter drone use by terrorist actors. By 2014, systems are 
deployed that allow law enforcement to take control of drones within a 2,000-yard radius 
of a protected target. The Coast Guard develops tactics for the use of these new 
technologies and establishes a standard training program for them. By early 2015, these 
laws, policies, plans, and tactics are in place across the United States (U.S.) domestic 
maritime domain. 
Tomorrow: A drone swarm attack takes place in New York Harbor against a 
Staten Island Ferry. Coast Guard officers on the ferry and on Coast Guard boats around 
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the harbor activate counter drone equipment, and 5,000 small drones fall into the water 
2,000 yards away from the ferry. At the same time, the New York Police Department 
automatically receives a Global Positioning System (GPS) location of the operator, some 
15 miles away in Brooklyn. One hour later, four subjects are arrested and taken into 
custody. Video and GPS data from the attackers’ equipment are seized and evaluated for 
further leads. No civilian casualties. 
Is this a far-fetched science fiction story or something closer to reality? 
Reports of UAV sightings and incidents are increasing within the domestic 
maritime domain. Cruise ships, U.S. Navy submarines, and facility owners have all 
reported drones overhead with no clear idea of intent or knowledge of what to do about 
them. A recent U.S. Army War College publication speaks directly to the potential threats 
UAVs present for homeland security. “The impact of even singular terrorist UAV use at 
this level is viewed as an immediate- and near-term problem. It may represent more of a 
domestic security issue than an overseas basing or deployment threat—although such 
weaponized devices could just as easily be utilized for terrorist purposes overseas against 
service personnel and their families as they could be used against civilians in the United 
States.”1 
In August 2015, the Federal Aviation Administration announced that it had hired 
“two high-level officials to help lead the agency’s regulation of drone flight in the United 
States.”2 The positions are “designed to focus on outreach to other areas of the 
government and airspace stakeholders, and help create regulations to safely integrate 
drones into the nation’s airspace.”3 
While these efforts are a step in the right direction, the timing suggests that the 
federal government did not identify the risks associated with drones in time to develop 
measures prior to the risks becoming a reality. Regulations are not in place as of this 
writing. Law enforcement officials currently do not have clear guidance or laws to 
                                                 
1 Robert Bunker, Terrorists and Insurgent Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Use, Potentials, and Military 
Implications (Carlisle, PA: The United States Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2015).  
2 Mario Trujilo, “FAA Bolsters Drone Outreach with New Hires,” The Hill, September 2015. 
3 Ibid. 
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enforce regarding the use of drones in areas of security concerns. Price points and 
availability of drones are making this technology a reality for the general public. Payload 
abilities are increasing and “swarm” drone technology is quickly coming to fruition. 
Government efforts to establish policies, laws, and countermeasures are lagging. This 
thesis proposes an alternative analysis red teaming program, whose components if in 
place, could have identified this emergent technology and the potential impacts it might 
have on domestic maritime security efforts. 
B. PROBLEM SPACE 
The importance of DHS anti-terrorism programs cannot be overstated. Protecting 
U.S. citizens from the threat of terrorism is the cornerstone upon which the DHS is based. 
As a component of the DHS and the department’s lead for maritime security,4 the Coast 
Guard is charged with executing the U.S. domestic maritime anti-terrorism program via 
the ports, waterways, and coastal security (PWCS) mission.5 The Maritime Security 
Response Operations (MSRO) Manual establishes the Coast Guard and its other agency 
partners’ operational activity standards, such as maritime critical infrastructure and key 
resources visits, patrol frequencies, security zone enforcement, and vessel escort 
requirements.6 This set of anti-terrorism activities, defined by policy and tactical 
guidance, is the U.S. government’s domestic maritime anti-terrorism program. 
Threats from terrorism persist and continue to evolve; attack methods are harder 
to predict and do not come from any one individual or group.7 It is critical that Coast 
Guard policy, plans, and tactics maintain pace with the ever-changing risks associated 
with terrorism. As both a military and federal law enforcement organization, the Coast 
Guard faces the broad challenges each of these organizational structures are afflicted 
                                                 
4 U.S. Government Accountability Office, COAST GUARD Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, 
but More Training Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and Operations (GAO-12-14) 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011). 
5 “U.S. Coast Guard Port Waterways, and Coast Security,” last modified October 31, 2014, 
http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg532/pwcs.asp. 
6 U.S. Government Accountability Office, COAST GUARD Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, 
but More Training Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and Operations. 
7 “Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security,” last published August 26, 2015, http://www. 
dhs.gov/preventing-terrorism-and-enhancing-security. 
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with, including a lack of creativity for the sake of efficient execution.8 As with any 
human system, the organization is fallible, susceptible to beliefs, biases, and constraints 
that may skew American decision making and analysis.9 The domestic maritime security 
enterprise must account for this fluid environment and “address the uncertainty that 
frames anti-terrorism pragmatic decisions.”10 
The Coast Guard terrorism risk assessment program is one of the most highly 
regarded risk assessment programs in the federal government.11 However, the elements 
involved have limitations, specifically in terms of the ability to conduct alternative 
analysis and the assessment of risk from the terrorist’s point of view. These limitations 
result in a lack of quantifiable and qualitative data concerning terrorist attack methods 
within the domestic maritime domain.  
Quantifiable data is data that can be measured, verified, and are amenable to 
statistical manipulation. Qualitative data are more varied and include virtually any non-
numerical information that can be captured.12 Current Coast Guard domestic maritime 
terrorism risk assessment efforts depend heavily on qualitative data from local subject 
matter expert (SME) judgments.13 While SME observations are useful in providing 
context to assessment processes, quantifiable data is a critical element to terrorism risk 
assessment.14 To date, the domestic maritime domain has not experienced any attempted 
terrorist attacks. While a good thing, it makes risk assessment more difficult precisely 
because of the absence of data or precedent. Without baseline examples of terrorist 
                                                 
8 UK Ministry of Defense, Red Teaming Guide, 2nd ed. (London: UK Ministry of Defense, 2013). 
9 UK Ministry of Defense, Red Teaming Guide, 1–1. 
10 Mateski, “Why We Red Team: The Tyranny of Uncertainty.”  
11 U.S. Government Accountability Office, COAST GUARD Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, 
but More Training Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and Operations. 
12 “Qualitative Data,” last revised October 20, 2006, http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/ 
qualdata.php.  
13 U.S. Government Accountability Office, COAST GUARD Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, 
but More Training Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and Operations. 
14 Steve Ressler, “Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present, and 
Future Research,” Homeland Security Affairs 2, art. 8 (July 2006), https://www.hsaj.org/articles/171. 
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abilities and intent within the domestic maritime domain, maritime homeland security 
professionals must rely on risk assessment and analysis models. 
The Coast Guard conducts terrorism risk assessment and analysis for the maritime 
transportation sub-sector via its Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM).15 
Within the MSRAM program, experts gather information and make assessments of 
terrorist abilities and intent against a predetermined set of attack scenarios and targets. 
These assessments are based on the knowledge of the expert and aided by a core set of 
tools and standards. While MSRAM is a validated terrorism risk assessment model, its 
reliance on SME judgments is problematic because “SME judgments provide ambiguous 
probabilities of a successful attack occurring.”16 
Current Coast Guard terrorism risk analysis defines risk based on a predetermined 
set of attack scenarios.17 While it provides stability for the MSRAM assessment program, 
it does not allow for the evaluation of other potential and emerging attack scenarios. A 
2010 GAO report regarding passenger ferry security states that while the Coast Guard 
assesses terrorism risk in the maritime domain, the organization “may be missing 
opportunities to enhance ferry security.”18 By not evaluating alternative attack scenarios, 
the Coast Guard limits the opportunities for successfully reducing the terrorism risk in the 
domestic maritime domain.  
According to Fishbein and Treverton, “alternative analysis seeks to help analysts 
and policy-makers stretch their thinking through structured techniques that challenge 
underlying assumptions and broaden the range of possible outcomes considered.”19 Red 
                                                 
15 U.S. Government Accountability Office, COAST GUARD Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, 
but More Training Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and Operations. 
16 Louis Anthony Cox, “Some Limitations of Risk= Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence for Risk 
Analysis of Terrorist Attacks,” Risk Analysis International Journal 28, no. 6 (December 2008): 749–1761. 
17 U.S. Government Accountability Office, COAST GUARD Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, 
but More Training Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and Operations, 3. 
18 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Ferry Security Measures Have Been Implemented, but 
Evaluating Existing Studies Could Further Enhance Security (GAO-11-207) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2010), 29. 
19 Warren Fishbein and Gregory Treverton, “Rethinking “Alternative Analysis” to Address 
Transnational Threats,” Occasional Papers, Sherman Kent Center, Central Intelligence Agency 3, no. 2 
(October 2004), https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol3no2.htm. 
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teaming is a form of alternative analysis that is well suited to support terrorism risk 
assessment and analysis. Red teaming is a practice carried out by a group in a cooperative 
environment to question conventions, procedures, administrations, and competencies 
from an adversarial perspective.20 This thesis conducts research into the principles and 
practises of red teaming, applies them to the Coast Guard anti-terrorism constructs in 
place, and proposes a model for a domestic maritime anti-terrorism red teaming program. 
“Defined loosely, red teaming is the practice of viewing a problem from an 
adversary or competitor’s perspective.”21 The Coast Guard conducts terrorism risk 
analysis from a defender’s point of view.22 The integration of an adversarial perspective 
into the existing Coast Guard risk analysis constructs could add valuable insights into 
current and future terrorist attack methods within the domestic maritime domain.  
An additional application for alternative analysis is in support of policy 
development. “The goal of most red teams is to enhance decision making, either by 
specifying the adversary’s preferences and strategies or by simply acting as a devil’s 
advocate.”23 Red teaming can be used to review current and under development policies 
from an adversary’s point of view. This approach could prove value added within the 
area of domestic maritime anti-terrorism policy formulation. 
This thesis explores an application of alternative analysis red teaming not 
currently addressed in the literature. A wealth of information is available on red teaming 
for business and military applications. However, a gap exists regarding red teaming’s 
application in the homeland security terrorism risk management field of practice. This 
evaluation highlights a potential use of red teaming in support of domestic maritime anti-
terrorism programs. 
 
                                                 
20 Matthew Lauder, “Red Dawn: The Emergence of a Red Teaming Capability in the Canadian 
Forces,” Canadian Army Journal 12, no. 2 (2009): 31. 
21 “Red Teaming and Alternative Analysis,” accessed January 11, 2015, http://redteamjournal. 
com/about/red-teaming-and-alternative-analysis/.  
22 U.S. Government Accountability Office, COAST GUARD Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, 
but More Training Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and Operations. 
23 “Red Teaming and Alternative Analysis.” 
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Conceptually, the program would be comprised of three components: 
• Physical red teaming that identifies the capabilities of would-be attackers 
to conduct elements of a terrorist attack within the maritime domain. The 
program’s outputs would be quantifiable data elements incorporated into 
the existing MSRAM program. 
• Identification of future attack scenarios. A program that conducts 
assessments of emerging technologies and their potential application for 
terrorist attacks within the domestic maritime domain. The program’s 
outputs would include descriptions of the technologies, application within 
the domestic maritime domain, and potential countermeasures. 
• Policy red teaming. A program that assesses the level to which policy 
meets strategic goals. Specifically, how Coast Guard domestic maritime 
anti-terrorism policies reduce the risk of terrorist attacks. 
To develop the program and capture intermediate results, in this thesis, the author 
proposes a minimum viable program approach for domestic maritime red teaming. This 
minimum viable program would provide value to Coast Guard risk management practices 
and allow the organization to learn more about and developed an integrated red teaming 
program in real time. 
To describe the concept of minimum viable program, it is helpful to understand 
the more common term of minimum viable product. “A minimum viable product is that 
version of a new product that allows a team to collect the maximum amount of validated 
learning about customers with the least effort.”24 In other terms, “a minimum viable 
product is the smallest thing you can build that delivers customer value (and as a bonus 
captures some of that value back).”25 
Within this thesis, the author utilizes the definitions and concepts of minimum 
viable product to propose a minimum viable program within the Coast Guard. He defines 
a minimum viable program as the collection of initial policy, training, techniques, and 
procedures (TTP), and tools, which are entered into a learning loop to establish a 
                                                 
24 Eric Ries, The Lean Startup: How Today’s Entrepreneurs Use Continuous Innovation to Create 
Radically Successful Businesses (New York: Random House LLC, 2011), 70. 
25 Ash Maurya, “Minimum Viable Product,” LeanStack, accessed July 21, 2015, http://practice 
trumpstheory.com/minimum-viable-product. 
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program, while improving and developing its elements to meet strategic objective(s) of 
an agency. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis answers the question of “How can the alternative analysis concepts of 
red teaming be leveraged to enhance the value of domestic maritime anti-terrorism 
activities?” 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
The literature review focuses on the schools of thought regarding the types of red 
teaming, and implementation of red teaming programs. The literature can be divided into 
three subcategories. The first is the definition of red teaming, and related lexicon. The 
second category relates to the development of red teaming through history. The third 
category is literature that focuses on the elements of and execution of red teaming 
programs.  
In the academic homeland security field, little research is currently associated 
with the subject of red teaming. One of the most significant references to red teaming 
within homeland security can be found in the 9–11 Commission Report, which states that 
red teaming programs are “notably lacking within the homeland security and intelligence 
elements of the Federal government.”26 
2. Red Teaming Literature Approaches/Methods/Techniques 
This subcategory of red teaming literature is generally comprised of journal 
articles and postings that focus on the execution of red teaming programs. For the most 
part, this area of red teaming sub-literature is recent, and most content can be accessed 
via online society journal websites, such as The Red Teaming Journal.27 The majority of 
                                                 
26 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attack upon the United States (Washington, DC: National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States), 352. 
27 “Home,” accessed January 11, 2015, http://redteamjournal.com/. 
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the literature in this category focuses on military applications of red teaming, the starting 
points of which are captured in a Department of Defense report entitled Defense Science 
Board Task Force on The Role and Status of DOD Red Teaming Activities.28 The same 
can be said internationally. In 2013, the United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defence 
produced a report within which the authors argue that “Red Teaming activities range 
from scrutinizing and challenging emerging thoughts, ideas, and underpinning 
assumptions, to considering the perspectives of adversaries, competitors or outsiders.”29 
Both these documents provide clear arguments for the role of red teaming, and red cell 
activities in support of defense department mission planning and management elements. 
Red teaming homeland security concepts are of limited focus, most of which are 
focused upon counter-terrorism aspects. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
has produced several reports involving red teaming for homeland security items including 
a 2007 testimony report regarding GAO’s red teaming activities with Transportation 
Security Administration passenger screeners.30 Of note is a current focus within many 
journals on red teaming within the cyber domain, for example.  
3. Value of Red Teaming  
This subcategory of red teaming literature is generally comprised of congressional 
reports and testimony related to the value of red team programs. The majority of this 
collection focuses on military applications,31 along with some homeland security 
applications. For example, a 2004 Sandia National Laboratories report discusses the 
value of red team and red gaming programs for homeland security applications.32  
                                                 
28 Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, The Role and 
Status of DOD Red Teaming Activities (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2003). 
29 UK Ministry of Defense, Red Teaming Guide, 2–1.  
30 Gregory Kutz and John Cooney, Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Exposed through Covert Testing 
of TSA’s Passenger Screening Process: Testimony before the Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform, House of Representatives (GAO-08-48T) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2007). 
31 Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, The Role and 
Status of DOD Red Teaming Activities. 
32 Judy Moore, John Whitley, and Rick Craft, Red Gaming in Support of the War on Terrorism: 
Sandia Red Game Report (SAND2004-0438) (Albuquerque, NM and Livermore, CA: Sandia National 
Laboratories, 2004). 
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4. Red Teaming Structure and Focus 
An area of differing opinion with the literature revolves around the structure of 
red teaming programs. Authors, such as Gregory Fontenot, write from the position that 
red teaming should be free form in nature, and devoted to planning elements. It needs to 
be empowered to submit independent opinions and alternative perspectives separated 
from an organization’s functional processes and procedures.33  
Others, such as Richard Craft, view red teamer’s true role as developing the 
options and responses available to adversaries or competitors.34 The Department of Army 
literature generally describes the functional elements of red teaming as “a critical insight 
process, supporting decision makers via a structured iterative process.”35 Homeland 
security literature tends to view red teaming from the point of view of SMEs with the 
skills to understand how to attack systems and specific target types.36  
From a strategic point of view, red teaming literature focuses upon processes that 
support senior level decision making. The Red Team Handbook states, “The penultimate 
purpose of red teaming and applying critical thinking techniques is to support the 
organization in reaching good decisions while avoiding the lure of groupthink”37  
Generally speaking, a disparity exists regarding the focus of red teaming efforts. 
In other words, should red teaming concentrate upon assuming the role of adversaries, or 
place a full emphasis on challenging aspects, plans, and the program’s abilities to meet 
desired results.38 
                                                 
33 Moore, Whitley, and Craft, Red Gaming in Support of the War on Terrorism: Sandia Red Game 
Report. 
34 Richard Craft, A Concept for the Use of Red Teams in Homeland Defense (Livermore, CA: Sandia 
National Laboratories, 2002). 
35 Timothy Malone and Reagan Schaupp, “The Red Team, Forging a Well-Conceived Contingency 
Plan,” Aerospace Power Journal XVI, no. 2 (Summer 2002). 
36 Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1962), 73. 
37 University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook 
(formerly the Red Team Handbook (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: University of Foreign Military and Cultural 
Studies, 2015), 57, http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/ufmcs/The_Applied_Critical_ 
Thinking_Handbook_v7.0.pdf. 
38 Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, The Role and 
Status of DOD Red Teaming Activities, 2. 
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5. Red Teaming Definition 
A source of divergence within red teaming literature is the definition of the actual 
term red teaming. Red teaming is not easily defined, as it is applied to different forms and 
various types of problems.39 The widespread range of activities includes red teaming for 
business decisions, federal government policy, war fighting plan development, and 
insurance industry standards to name a few. Literature focused on homeland security 
tends to focus on terrorist actions, and “attacker and defender” type of scenarios. One 
area of agreement within the literature is included within the goal or stated objective of 
red teaming. Red teaming should contest organizational assumptions from the adversarial 
perspective to gain a greater understanding of vulnerabilities and risks.40 Otherwise, 
stated, red teaming is “a peer review process of a concept or proposed course of 
action.”41  
6. Red Cell Definition 
Red teaming literature points out the specific differences between the terms red 
teaming and red cell. The UK Ministry of Defense Red Teaming Guide provides the most 
relevant definitions.  
The role of the red team is to challenge the perceived norms and 
assumptions of the commander and his staff in order to improve the 
validity and quality of the final plan. Red Cell is a J2 (intelligence) entity 
which focuses on the activities of potential adversaries and threats. A red 
cell may also play the adversarial role(s) in any wargaming or debate 
undertaken to assist decision making during the planning process. The red 
cell uses established red teaming techniques to achieve their role, but their 
terms of reference are much more specific than those of the red team.42 
                                                 
39 Mike McGannon, “Developing Red Team Tactics, Techniques and Procedures,” Red Team Journal, 
April 2004. 
40 Anna Culpepper, “Effectiveness of Using Red Teams to Identify Maritime Security Vulnerabilities 
to Terrorist Attack” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 9. 
41 Malone and Schaupp, “The Red Team: Forging a Well-Conceived Contingency Plan,” 23. 
42 UK Ministry of Defense, Red Teaming Guide, 4–2. 
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7. Red Teaming Development Across History 
A subcategory of the literature speaks to the use of and development of red 
teaming through the course of time. In their paper on military problem solving, Brewer, 
Shubik, and Martin state that the origins of red teaming can be traced to 19th century 
Germany and the development of Kliegspiele or war game.43 According to that group, 
Kliespiele is “a rules-based map simulation war game, allowed for the opportunity to 
train and test concepts and plans while evaluating leadership.”44  
This concept of wargaming evolved over the years, and expanded out to other 
countries and branches of government. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the 
Executive Committee of the National Security Council was established to inform the 
Kennedy White House on the situation and to develop a suite of potential courses of 
action.45 The committee was charged, among other things, to seek alternative courses of 
action to the strong military response proposals being presented. 
8. Red Teaming Programs 
An additional subcategory of literature addresses how red teaming programs are 
executed. As many methods of execution exist as do red teaming programs, which 
contributes to the lack of a clear, concise red teaming definition.46 However, most red 
teaming approaches can be described as falling into two broad groups, either passive or 
active.47  
Kirpatrick states that passive red teaming is used to “define alternatives and 
challenge existing assumptions.”48 It may also help define how an adversary might adapt. 
                                                 
43 Gary Brewer and Martin Shubik, The War Game: A Critique of Military Problem Solving 
(Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1979), 23. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, The Role and 
Status of DOD Red Teaming Activities, 3. 
46 Ibid., 4. 
47 Malone and Schaupp, “The Red Team: Forging a Well-Conceived Contingency Plan.” 
48 Shelley Kirkpatrick, Shelly Asher, and Catherine Bott, Staying One Step Ahead: Advancing Red 
Teaming Methodologies through Innovation (Arlington, VA: Homeland Security Institute, 2005), 4. 
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The U.S. Department of Defense states the purpose of passive red teaming “is to aid and 
organization by providing critical analysis to anticipate problems and avoid surprise.”49  
Active red teaming is generally used to test tactics before use. Referencing 
Kirpatrick, graduate research student A. Bentley Nettles, explains that by acting as a 
competitor, red teaming “is used to train staffs to respond to adversarial actions.”50 In the 
perspective of military planning the U.S. Department of Defense identifies the purpose of 
active red teaming “is to sharpen skills, expose vulnerabilities that adversaries might 
exploit and, in general, increase understanding of potential actions and counter-actions of 
potential adversaries.”51  
9. Areas for Further Research  
Areas of red teaming that further research would be value added include the use 
of gaming, or virtual red teaming tools, and how social media “tools” factor into red 
teaming. In both cases, identifying how emerging technologies fit into the programs and 
procedures for red teaming would enhance the understanding of red teaming concepts. 
10. Conclusions 
The literature related to red teaming provides a wide spectrum and disparate 
views regarding the definition of red teaming, its development and use throughout 
history, and elements of red teaming programs. While the volume of information is of 
value, the variation in views results in difficulties in defining subcategories of literature 
and capturing a consensus of views on red teaming. One conclusion seems to be 
appropriate, if you have seen one red teaming program, you have seen one red teaming 
program. As a result, the author would argue that further research into elements of red 
teaming, and its value at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, is appropriate. 
Further, the author would say that additional research in the red teaming applications for 
                                                 
49 Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, The Role and 
Status of DOD Red Teaming Activities, 4. 
50 A. Bentley Nettles, “The President Has No Clothes: The Case for Broader Application of Red 
Teaming within Homeland Security” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
51 Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, The Role and 
Status of DOD Red Teaming Activities, 4. 
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non-military applications, such as homeland security and business applications, is 
warranted. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The following sections take the reader through the research design used in this 
thesis and describe the design in terms of object/sample, selection, limits, data sources, 
type of analysis, and output of this project.  
Object/Sample: The author has studied red team analysis, and its application 
within the Coast Guard’s terrorism risk analysis programs, as well as its use for policy 
analysis. He have also reviewed federal government reports and publications that 
highlight the role of red teaming at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The 
concepts of social identity theory and its role in red teaming were additionally analyzed.  
In addition, he has reviewed Coast Guard terrorism risk management programs 
and policy that made it possible to identify areas within the organization that would 
benefit from red teaming processes. This review led to his exploration of intergrading and 
leveraging red team functions within the Coast Guard Academy to benefit the 
organization and enhance educational experience of future Coast Guard officers. 
Selection: U.S. Department of Defense publications provide detailed information 
on red teaming in various levels of the department. A similar UK Ministry of Defense 
publication provides further details on the benefits of red teaming, and its integration into 
a planning cycle. A Government of Canada homeland security journal discusses red team 
applications for national level security events and its application for the 2010 Vancouver 
Winter Olympics. The author intended to research the various approaches, identify value 
added red team concepts, and apply them to current domestic maritime anti-terrorism 
constructs. 
Limits: This research does not address red teaming in terms of cyber security; 
rather, the focus is on red teaming for physical attacks. It also does not discuss red 
teaming use for exercises, or any training requirements for red teams with the exception 
of potential integration of red teaming concepts into Coast Guard Academy syllabi. 
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Additionally, the research does not explore the specific details of the Coast Guard risk 
assessment and analysis programs, nor specifics on the qualitative and quantitative data 
contained within.  
The scope of this thesis focused on establishing red teaming programs in support 
of the existing Coast Guard maritime terrorism risk assessment and analysis constructs. 
The author chose this area of study after identifying a potential opportunity to make 
improvements to the existing risk assessment programs. His scope did not include the 
testing of any other tools to address areas of improvement in Coast Guard terrorism risk 
assessment.  
Data Sources: The author leveraged Coast Guard terrorism doctrine and policy, as 
well as red teaming principles and processes as his primary data sources. GAO reports, 
Department of Defense and DHS publications, red team society journals, and books 
discussing red teaming rounded out the rest of his sources.  
Type and Mode of Analysis: This thesis includes analysis and an examination of 
implementing a red team program within the Coast Guard. Analysis  begins with a 
discussion of the domestic maritime domain and the Coast Guard’s terrorism risk 
assessment and analysis programs. There will also be inquiry into why red teaming would 
be value added functions at the tactical, operational and policy levels within the Coast 
Guard.  
Output: A finished product of the analysis would include specific 
recommendations about the benefits of incorporating red teaming into the existing 
maritime terrorism risk management system. It further makes recommendations regarding 
the potential value of leveraging the Coast Guard Academy within the described red 
teaming program. 
F. UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
In the upcoming chapters, the author provides readers insight into the complex 
operating environment known as the domestic maritime domain. Following this 
discussion, he explores red teaming, best practices, components, and examples of its use 
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within both military and homeland security frameworks. He  also discusses the concept of 
social identity theory’s role in red teaming. From these foundational principles, he 
explores a proposal for a domestic maritime domain red team program. This proposal 
includes specifics on a physical red team program, future attack scenario red team 
program, and policy red team program. In addition, he provides information on the 
implementation of the proposed red team programs, which includes the concept of a 
minimal viable program in the federal government, and considerations for the successful 
implementation of the proposed programs, as well as an exploration of the use of Coast 
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II. THE DOMESTIC MARITIME DOMAIN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis explores the potentials of red teaming for domestic maritime anti-
terrorism programs within the Coast Guard. To investigate these concepts, it is first 
necessary to define the geographic and operational landscape within which the Coast 
Guard operates. This chapter provides an overview of the diverse elements that make up, 
and influence, the domestic maritime domain. In addition, this chapter informs the reader 
on the regulations, operations, and risk management functions the Coast Guard leverages 
to address terrorism risks. This fundamental information is a base of knowledge that 
supports an examination of red teaming within the domestic maritime domain.  
The maritime domain is defined as “all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, 
adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all 
maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other 
conveyances.”52 The Maritime Transportation System (MTS) is within the maritime 
domain. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan defines the MTS as “about 95,000 
miles of coastline, 361 ports, over 10,000 miles of navigable waterways, 3.4 million 
square miles of Exclusive Economic Zone to secure, and intermodal landside 
connections.”53 This system is a vital link in the U.S. intermodal transportation system. 
Over 75% of all international goods and the majority of all bulk and containerized cargo 
enter U.S. maritime ports with follow-on transportation primarily via the rail and trucking 
modes.54  
In 2014, an estimated $2.56 trillion of goods were imported into the United States, 
which constitutes an average overall growth of 5.29% since 2009, with forecasts 
                                                 
52 Department of Defense and Homeland Security, National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain 
Awareness for the National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, DC: Department of Defense and 
Homeland Security, 2005). 
53 “National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Transportation Systems Sector,” accessed December 9, 
2014, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp_transport.pdf.  
54 House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Improving the Nation’s Freight 
Transportation System: Findings and Recommendations of the Special Panel on 21st Century Freight 
Transportation (2013), 29. 
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indicating an increase to $3.09 trillion worth of goods being imported by 2019.55 The 
World Trade Organization lists the United States as the largest importer of goods in the 
world, “accounting for 12.6% of the world total.”56 Also, 99.4% of all overseas cargo 
volume moves through U.S. seaports, roughly totaling $3.8 billion worth of goods each 
day.57 Impacts of any disruption of the MTS can “have national ramifications, as the 
MTS is the critical component of the national supply chain.”58 Understanding the 
potential and future threats to the system are a key basis in managing the risks of 
terrorism within the domestic maritime domain. 
The MTS is a system of systems, comprised of waterways, seaports, vessels, and 
facilities. The United States has roughly 360 commercial ports that consist of both public 
(owned and managed by state, regional, and local port authorities) and privately owned 
facilities with approximately 150 different seaport agencies, navigation districts, and port 
authorities making up the industry.59 The maritime system is comprised of more than 
3,700 cargo and passenger terminals and nearly 8,200 commercial cargo-handling 
docks.60 The volume of containerized cargo entering the United States has increased by 
over 170 percent since 1990.61 Container ship size and capacity is continuing to grow 
with the most recent production of the “Triple-E” cargo ship capable of carrying 9,000 
containers.62 The MTS is a transportation mode through which goods and people are 
transported in, out, and across the United States via maritime means. The system is 
                                                 
55 “Business Environment Profiles—Total Import,” March 2014, http://clients1.ibisworld.com.nduez 
proxy.idm.oclc.org/reports/us/bed/default.aspx?entid=1533.  
56 Ibid. 
57 “U.S. Port Industry,” accessed December 8, 2014, http://www.aapa-ports.org/industry. 
58 Committee on the Marine Transportation System, National Strategy for the Marine Transportation 
System: A Framework for Action (Washington, DC: The Secretary of Transportation, 2008). 
59 “U.S. Port Industry.” 
60 House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Improving the Nation’s Freight 
Transportation System: Findings and Recommendations of the Special Panel on 21st Century Freight 
Transportation, 29. 
61 Department of Homeland Security, Safety, Security and Stewardship (Washington, DC: Director of 
Strategic Management and Doctrine, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, 2011), 4. 
62 Marco Werman and Drake Bennet, “Holy Ship! Triple E—The Biggest Container Ship in the 
World,” PRI The World, September 9, 2013, http://www.pri.org/stories/2013-09-09/holy-ship-triple-e-
biggest-container-ship-world. 
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critical to the nation’s economy and stability and can pose as an attractive target for 
would-be terrorists.  
B. REGULATORY AND GRANT PROGRAMS THAT INFLUENCE MTS 
SECURITY  
In 2002, the DHS was established by combining 22 separate federal agencies 
under one federal entity responsible for the coordination and unification of homeland 
security efforts.63 The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) was signed into 
law that same year, primarily to protect the ports and waterways from terrorist attacks. 
The MTSA established a standard approach to addressing security risk within the ports, 
waterways, and coastal approaches including constructs for public and private 
partnerships to address security risks. 
The MTSA increased security requirements and put a new lens on how risk is 
evaluated and assessed within the nation’s maritime domain. Specifically, the MTSA set 
“the requirement for port facilities to conduct vulnerability assessments and develop 
security plans”64 and resulted in the establishment of area maritime security committees 
(AMSCs), led by each Coast Guard Captain of the Port.65 This construct of assessment, 
planning, and coordinating bodies set the foundations of maritime risk management 
systems managed by public, private, and governmental elements. It provides the base of a 
layered approach to reducing terrorism risk within the MTS. Red teaming can assist in 
validating or redirecting the efforts of the AMSCs by providing an alternative analysis of 
plans and threats. 
Domestic port security is not solely managed by the federal government. Owners 
and operators of facilities and vessels play a significant role in reducing terrorism risk. 
Additionally, local and state law enforcement and emergency responders contribute to the 
risk reduction efforts. The Port Security Grant Program provides funding to private and 
public elements within the MTS to reduce vulnerabilities to and consequences of terrorist 
                                                 
63 “Home,” accessed December 8, 2014, www.dhs.gov/home. 
64 “Maritime Transportation Security Act,” accessed December 8, 2014, https://homeport.uscg.mil.  
65 Ibid. 
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attacks within the MTS. Fiscal year (FY) 2014 DHS grant funding across six DHS 
preparedness grant programs totaled $1.6 billion and was targeted at strengthening the 
nation’s “ability to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from 
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies in support of the National 
Preparedness Goal and the National Preparedness System.”66  
For FY 2014, the DHS directed grantees to prioritize grant funds based on the 
grantees’ capability targets and gaps as identified through the Threat and Hazard 
Identification and Risk Assessment and annual State Preparedness Report.67 
Additionally, $1.6 billion was provided across six different grant programs, with $100 
million for the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP). The PSGP is designed to “help 
protect to help protect critical port infrastructure from terrorism, enhance maritime 
domain awareness, improve port-wide maritime security risk management, and maintain 
or reestablish maritime security mitigation protocols that support port recovery and 
resiliency capabilities.”68 Focusing port security grant funding on the greatest risk 
reduction return of investment is a critical element of the overall domestic maritime anti-
terrorism effort. The red teaming program the author proposes would specifically provide 
assessment and analysis currently not available to the PSGP. 
C. COAST GUARD DOMESTIC MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS 
The PWCS mission is one of the Coast Guard’s statutory homeland security 
missions (Section 888 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002). To fulfill the PWCS 
mission, the Coast Guard employs a strategy that consists of three key elements executed 
simultaneously to stem specific threats when known, and to mitigate general terror-
related risks in the maritime domain at all times. “The elements are; achieve maritime 
                                                 
66 Department of Homeland Security, DHS Announces Grant Guidance for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 
Preparedness Grants (Washington, DC: DHS Press Office, 2014). 
67 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Emergency 
Management, Intergovernmental Relations, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Government Affairs, U.S. Senate, National Preparedness—FEMA Has Made Progress, But 
Additional Steps Are Needed to Improve Grant Management and Assess Capabilities (Statement of David 
C. Maurer, Director Homeland Security and Justice) (GAO-13-637T) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2013). 
68 Ibid. 
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domain awareness, establish and oversee a maritime security regime, and lead and 
conduct effective maritime security and response operations (MSRO).”69  
The MSRO element refers to a diverse suite of activities that include but are not 
limited to the following. 
• Security patrols to project credible deterrence near critical infrastructure 
• Pre-entry security boardings of high-interest vessels before they transit 
domestic ports 
• Security boardings of small vessels to support DHS’ Small Vessel 
Security Strategy and mitigate risk of a waterborne improvised explosive 
device attack  
• Positive control measures to ensure vessels remain under the control of 
vetted crews during transits of domestic ports 
• Fixed security zone enforcement, primarily to protect key locations or 
events  
• Moving security zone enforcement for point protection of selected 
shipping 
The performance standards for MSRO activities are risk informed. The execution 
of MSRO activities is measured through a combination of output and outcome measures. 
To assess the impact of PWCS mission execution, the Coast Guard uses a risk-based 
performance model to evaluate the percent reduction in maritime security risk that the 
Coast Guard can influence. Red teaming constructs can be tailored to inform these 
performance measures. 
The layered maritime security construct is not limited to domestic operations. 
Coast Guard personnel visit foreign ports and “assess the effectiveness of anti-terrorism 
measures that the ports have implemented to comply with the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security (ISPS) Code.”70 Boarding teams deployed from Coast Guard cutters 
conduct suspect vessel security boardings as far offshore the U.S. coasts as practicable. 
Large Coast Guard cutters maintain a persistent offshore presence. MDA tools, such as 
                                                 
69 Derived from internal Coast Guard documents drafted by the author. 
70 Ibid. 
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long-range identification and tracking, and the National Automated Identification 
System, are used in offshore tracking, surveillance, and interdiction. As U.S. and foreign 
vessels approach the coast and their ports of call, they give the required advance notice of 
arrival and provide key vessel, cargo, and crew information. The identification of 
potential threat streams plays a critical role in these operations. Red teaming protocols 
can directly support those efforts. 
In U.S. waters and ports, vessels perform the security measures required of them 
by their approved MTSA or ISPS vessel security plans. At all times, MTSA-regulated 
facilities in U.S. ports perform the security measures required of them by their approved 
facility security plans. Vessels and facilities control access to their restricted areas to the 
holders of transportation worker identification credentials. U.S. ports enhance their 
preparedness and resiliency by periodically exercising their area maritime security 
plans.71 This layered approach of security operations combining federal, state, local, and 
industry efforts seeks to address the risks of terrorism within the domestic maritime 
domain. 
D. RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH TO DOMESTIC MARITIME 
TERRORISM 
The Oxford dictionary definition of risk management is…”(In business) the 
forecasting and evaluation of financial risks together with the identification of procedures 
to avoid or minimize their impact.”72 A recent GAO report defines risk management as... 
“a process that helps policymakers assess risk, strategically allocate finite resources, and 
take actions under conditions of uncertainty.”73 To put the definition in the context of 
homeland security, the 2010 DHS risk lexicon, states that risk management is “the 
process for identifying, analyzing, and communicating risk and accepting, avoiding, 
                                                 
71 Derived from internal Coast Guard documents drafted by the author. 
72 “Risk Management,” accessed January 14, 2015, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/ 
american_english/risk-management.  
73 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Transportation 
Security and Infrastructure Protection, Homeland Security Committee, House of Representatives, Risk 
Management, Strengthening the Use of Risk Management Principles in Homeland Security (Statement of 
Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice) (GAO-08-904T) (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008). 
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transferring, or controlling it to an acceptable level considering the associated costs and 
benefits of any actions taken.”74 It further defines risk as “potential for an unwanted 
outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood 
as well as the associated consequences.”75  
In simple terms, risk management is the “likelihood that a threat will harm an 
asset with some severity of consequences, and deciding on and implementing actions to 
reduce it” known as risk reduction measures.76 For terrorism risk, it can be translated as 
the likelihood that a terrorist attack would harm a target with some level of consequence. 
Risk management is the act of determining the level of that risk; then deciding on, 
planning, and taking actions to reduce that risk. Red teaming alternative analysis is a 
value added function available to assist in terrorism risk management.  
U.S. domestic maritime terrorism risk assessment and analysis is primarily 
conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard. The MSRAM is the primary tool and program 
executed by the Coast Guard to define the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences of 
potential terrorist actions within the domestic maritime domain.77 This program relies 
heavily on SME judgments as the primary method to define attackers’ abilities and 
potential attack methods. 
The Coast Guard leverages its role within the intelligence community in its efforts 
to define maritme terrorism risk. The MSRAM uses threat information from the Coast 
Guard intelligence coordination center (ICC), which “provides strategic intelligence 
support [and] serves as the Coast Guard’s primary interface with the collection, 
production, and dissemination elements of the national intelligence and law enforcement 
                                                 
74 Risk Steering Committee, DHS Risk Lexicon 2010 Edition (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2010). 
75 Ibid. 
76 “Building Design for Homeland Security,” accessed December 8, 2014, http://www.fema.gov/ 
pdf/plan/prevent/rms/155/e155_unit_v.pdf.  
77 “Maritime Security, Risk Analysis Model,” accessed January 14, 2015, http://aapa.files.cms-
plus.com/PDFs/MSRAMBrochureTrifold.pdf.  
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communities.”78 In terms of maritime terrorism risk assessment, threat is composed of 
two distinct elements, intent, and capability.79  
The Coast Guard conducts strategic assessments and analysis of maritime 
terrorism under those two categories. MSRAM utilizes threat data provided by the Coast 
Guard ICC. While this data is regionally specific, it is strategic in nature and not 
necessarily relevant to local maritime terrorism risk assessment and analysis. “It is not 
revolutionary to view terrorist through the lens of either intentions or capabilities. Yet 
terrorism analysis rarely combines the two across the range of potential threats in an 
area.”80 Red teaming operates in a similar manner; forms of physical red teaming seek to 
define attack scenarios from the adversary’s perspective. To do so, an analyst must 
approach the problem set with the intents and capabilities of the adversary in mind. 
In conclusion, the domestic maritime domain is a complex system of waterways, 
vessels, and facilities spread across the United States. The risks of terrorist attacks within 
this domain are substantial and complex. A combined approach by federal, state, local, 
and private entities seeks to address terrorism risk across the domain through operations, 
regulations, and grant funding. This risk management approach relies heavily on the 
Coast Guards’ terrorism risk assessment and analysis programs to guide efforts in 
achieving the greatest return on investment for anti-terrorism efforts. Red teaming 
functions, applied appropriately, can provide value to this effort.  
                                                 
78 Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 2: Naval Intelligence (Norfolk, VA: Naval 
Warfare Development Command, 2008), http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/content/Library/Documents/NDPs/ 
ndp2/ndp20007.htm. 
79 Michael D. Greenberg et al., Maritime Terrorism, Risk and Liability (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2006).  
80 Shawn Cupp and Michael G. Spight, A Homeland Security Model for Assessing U.S. Domestic 
Threats (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007). 
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III. RED TEAMING 
A. INTRODUCTION TO RED TEAMING 
Over the last 10 years or so, many commissions and panels have identified an 
alternative analysis as a means of improving analytical processes and decision making. In 
1998, the Jeremiah Panel was formed and tasked to identify why the United States was 
caught unaware when India and Pakistan conducted near simultaneous nuclear weapons 
tests.81 The panel lead, Admiral David Jeremiah, stated in his conclusions. “the bottom 
line is that both the intelligence and the policy communities had an underlying mindset 
going into these tests that the … newly governing Indian party would behave as we 
behave.”82 Assuming other parties will think and behave as everyone else does is a 
common error in policy development, one that red teaming seeks to correct. 
The 9/11 Commission asked, “why so little thought had been devoted to the 
danger of suicide pilots, seeing a ‘failure of imagination’ and a mindset that dismissed 
possibilities.”83 Various legislations have also identified similar needs. The 2006 
Homeland Security Act for example states, “The Act requires DHS to apply red team 
analysis to terrorist use of nuclear weapons and biological agents. As terrorists seek to 
exploit new vulnerabilities, it is imperative that appropriate tools be applied to meet those 
threats.”84 Red teams have been in existence for a long time. “Commercial enterprises, 
such as IBM, and government agencies such as Defense Intelligence and the Central 
Intelligence Agency, have long used them to reduce risks and to improve their problem 
solving.”85 The literature researched for this thesis identifies the value of such efforts to 
successful organizations. 
 
                                                 
81 Roger Z. George, “Fixing the Problem of Analytical Mindsets,” In Intelligence and the National 
Security Strategist, ed. Roger Z. George and Robert D. Kline (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). 
82 Ibid. 
83 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Final Report of the National 
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At the strategic level, red teaming is… “an intellectual approach used to analyze 
the organizations planning cycle and assumptions.”86 By providing an alternative 
analysis from an outside perspective, red teams add to, rather than replace, existing 
analytical efforts. Red teaming is an organizational process “undertaken by a flexible, 
independent, and expert team that aims to create a collaborative learning relationship by 
challenging assumptions, concepts, plans, operations, organizations, and capability 
through the eyes of adversaries in the context of a complex security environment.”87 As 
seen in Figure 1, the development of a red teaming effort can be tailored to an agency’s 
specific needs and evolves within a continuous loop cycle. 
Figure 1.  Red Teaming Program Development Cycle 
 
Source: “Red Teaming for Program Managers,” 2009, http://www.idart.sandia.gov/metho 
dology/RT4PM.html. 
The UK Ministry of Defense proposed definition of red teaming is “the 
independent application of a range of structured, creative and critical thinking techniques 
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87 Lauder, “Red Dawn: The Emergence of a Red Teaming Capability in the Canadian Forces,” 31. 
 29 
to assist the end user make a better-informed decision or produce a more robust 
product.”88 
A red cell is a specific element, distinct from overall red teaming. The UK 
Ministry of Defense describes red cells in the traditional military opposing forces 
manner. “Red cells generally play the adversarial role(s) in wargaming or debate 
undertaken to assist decision making during the planning process … The red cell uses 
established red teaming techniques to achieve their role, but their terms of reference are 
much more specific than those of the red team.”89 
Red teaming is a process by which an organization conducts an analysis from an 
adversary’s perspective. It is effective at countering a large organization’s tendency to 
minimize the problem set(s) they focus upon, and the tendencies such organizations have 
towards groupthink. “Clearly, the majority of failures to anticipate strategic surprise can 
be correlated with conceptual rigidity and a high incidence of perceptual continuity.”90 
Red teaming can support organizational decision making in a number of ways. In 
its “Red Teaming for Program Managers,” Sandia National Labs provides the following 
list of red teaming benefits: 
• Understand adversaries and operational environments, and assess threats 
• Anticipate program risk, identify security assumptions, and support 
security decisions 
• Explore and develop security options, policy, process, procedures, and 
impacts 
• Establish in-house red team 
• Identify and describe consequential program security requirements 
• Identify and describe consequential security design alternatives 
• Measure security progress and establish security baselines 
• Understand how system defeats adversaries 
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• Explore security of future concepts of operation 
• Test and train operations personnel response to attack 
• Identify and describe surprise, unintended consequences91 
As documented in the aforementioned list, red teaming is a support function to 
policy development and decision making. It provides organizations and decision makers 
information not normally considered, the point of view of the adversary. This perspective 
can be highly valuable in countering human tendencies towards groupthink and other 
trends associated with large organizations. “Analysts (and to a lesser extent, political and 
military leaders) should be encouraged to consider alternative interpretations of data and 
new evidence, and continuously to reevaluate their concept while avoiding dogmatic 
adherence to given concepts.”92 
Red teaming is also useful in defining organizational processes. “The common 
feature in all of these (red teaming) examples is the adversary’s or skeptic’s outlook taken 
on by an independent group. This shift in perspective recognizes the powerful 
psychological force that exists in all organizations not to challenge the way problems are 
framed—something that can lead to disaster.”93 The integration of red teaming into an 
organization’s decision-making process can counteract the tendencies towards neglecting 
alternatives in favor of standard practices.  
Red teaming can also be a valuable tool for reviewing decisions and policy. “A 
red team is especially useful to review decisions with large scale and complexity. This is 
because the momentum needed to launch such projects can lead to a feeling that team 
loyalty requires supporting them, and because the tendency to get lost in the many details 
leads people to overlook project risks as a whole.”94 Red teaming can assist in countering 
these tendencies by identifying risks from the adversarial perspective and weaknesses 
that would otherwise not be identified.  
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Some red teaming techniques are of value from a tactical perspective as well. 
Military and business organizations use red teaming as a means to identify vulnerabilities 
within their plans and defenses. “Technology giants like Microsoft and Apple use red 
teams to try to hack their own software, knowing that if they relied on software producers 
to judge this they would overlook many holes and vulnerabilities.”95 
A red teaming effort not properly designed or executed can do more harm than 
good. The goal of red teaming is to provide an alternative point of view, rather than 
simply validating an organization’s assumptions or decisions.96 Red teams need support 
from leadership in an organization to provide that adversaries’ point of view, which can 
be contrary to the culture of an organization.  
Successful red teams must “think like the adversary.” Take for example a large 
U.S. firm competing in the information technology (IT) market with numerous Chinese 
competitors. “Many U.S. firms find it difficult to understand the way Chinese companies 
think.”97 With the current globalazation of industry and surge of Chinese influence in 
those markets, red teams can bring a Chinese perspective to market analysis that is highly 
sought out.98 
B. RED TEAMING APPROACHES 
The Financial Times defines a red team as “an inside group that explicitly 
challenges a company’s strategy, products, and preconceived notions.”99 It further 
describes red teaming methods as framing a “problem from the perspective of an 
adversary or skeptic, to find gaps in plans and to avoid blunders.”100 “Red teams are one 
way to manage the biggest corporate risk of all: thoughtlessness.”101 Red teams conduct 
alternative analysis from the perspective of the adversary, with the goal of identifying 
                                                 








potential threats, and weaknesses in policy not identified through traditional assessment 
techniques. 
Red teaming is a common tool within the military. “Red teams assist the 
commander and staff with critical and creative thinking and help them avoid groupthink, 
mirror imaging, cultural missteps, and tunnel vision throughout the conduct of 
operations.”102 The Department of Defense has called for an increased use of red team 
analysis across the department in both policy and operational plan development 
processes.103  
“The most basic level of red teaming is to conduct peer review of plans and 
policies to detect vulnerabilities or perhaps to simply offer alternative views of 
scenarios.”104 For the purposes of this thesis, it is helpful to discuss red teaming in two 
general categories, physical and analytical red teaming. 
• Physical Red Teaming  
“A physical red team embodies the selected adversary, acting according to the 
selected group’s motivations, capabilities, and intent.”105 
• Analytical Red Teaming 
“During analytical red teaming, participants analyze the attack plans and look for 
indicators and warnings, key decision points, and vulnerabilities in the plan.”106 
According to the Under Secretary for Defense Acquisitions, red teaming functions 
at multiple levels within the DOD enterprise are: 
• Strategic level to challenge assumptions and visions 
• Operational level to challenge force postures, a commander’s war 
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• Plan and acquisition portfolios 
• Tactical level to challenge military units in training or programs in 
development107 
Red teams can take on numerous forms that are dependent upon the desired 
alternative analysis outputs.  
The Department of Defense defines three overall red team constructs, as shown in 
Table 1.108 
Table 1.   Examples Types of DOD Red Teams109 
Red Team Method Function 
Surrogate of 
Adversaries 
Expose vulnerabilities, understanding responses 
available to adversaries 




Independent advisory boards, other sources of 
independent judgment 
 
Combined or individually, these red team methods establish a framework for 
alternative analysis red teaming processes. Red teaming steps can be planned in great 
detail or be more free flowing in nature. In either case, red teaming functions should 
define, “who the red team reports to; how it interacts with the management of the 
enterprise and the owner of the activity it is challenging, and how the enterprise considers 
and uses its products.”110 
C. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY APPLICATIONS FOR RED TEAMING 
Social psychology theories and practices have value in understanding the 
perspectives of others. These concepts can be useful tools for conducting alternative 
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analysis of terrorist behaviors. “Alternative techniques force analysts to look at their own 
or peer’s work from varying viewpoints with the goal of scrutinizing a plan or thought 
against previously unforeseen scenarios.”111 Red teaming is a set of alternative analysis 
processes focused on an adversary’s point of view; thereby, conducting analysis from the 
adversary’s perspective. Social psychological concepts can assist a red team in seeing 
problems from another group’s point of view.  
These concepts can help in avoiding the more common pitfalls associated with 
terrorism analysis. This section discusses the value of social identify theory (SIT) to red 
teaming efforts, and explores concepts of in-groups, and out-groups as a means to assist a 
red team in avoiding some of the more common analysis hazards. “The modern use of 
Red Teams has almost exclusively operated around threat replication and security 
validation, and, therefore, offers very few insights into an enemy’s mental model or 
psychological mindset.”112  
Red teams may offset this analysis weakness by leveraging psychological models 
and approaches, such as SIT. This theory can assist in gaining an understanding of a 
terrorist perspective. “SIT postulates that the need for a positive and distinct identity will 
lead individuals to want to belong to groups that enable their members to fulfill their 
identity needs.”113 A red team can leverage an understanding of SIT to conduct an 
analysis through the lens of a terrorist’s group membership affiliation, as well as that 
group’s comparison of themselves to another. 
“SIT evaluates a person’s decisions and actions based on perceived group 
membership.”114 This theoretical approach can assist red teams in viewing their analysis 
from that perspective. For example, a red team conducting an assessment of anti-
terrorism defenses performs their analysis from an identified attacker’s perspective. 
When a red team fully adopts the concepts of SIT and group membership, they can begin 
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to understand a terrorist’s perspective. “From the terrorists’ point of view, terrorism is a 
rational problem-solving strategy.”115 Conducting an act of terrorism is to them, a 
justified means to achieve their in-groups goals.  
SIT can provide a structure to understand that perspective for what it truly is, 
allowing the analyst to filter out the biases of their own in-group to provide a red team an 
understanding of how a member of an out-group would approach an attack, vice how a 
member of their in-group perceives that attack would occur. Red team alternative 
analysis that accounts for this concept can provide unbiased analytical support to decision 
makers. SIT can provide a means by which a red team can gain an understanding of how 
other groups perceive the element they are analyzing. 
The concepts of in-groups and out-groups are core elements in the approach. 
“When a social identity is activated, people act to enhance the evaluation of the in-group 
relative to the out-group and thereby enhance their own evaluation as a group 
member.”116 According to McLeod, “We divided the world into ‘them’ and ‘us’ based 
through a process of social categorization (i.e., we put people into social groups).”117 
This explanation divides people into two groups, the in-group (us) and the out-group 
(them).118 “The central hypothesis of social identity theory is that group members of an 
in-group will seek to find negative aspects of an out-group, thus enhancing their self-
image.”119 
To analyze adequately from the perspective of a terrorist, red teams must gain an 
understanding of the terrorist’s in-group to allow the red teams to view the element they 
are analyzing from the adversaries’ point of view. An understanding how a terrorist 
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becomes radicalized and the hermeneutics that make up their in-groups narratives can 
provide a red team the ability to approach analysis as the terrorist would.  
Also needed is an understanding of the concept of the out-group. This concept 
introduces an approach, which states that individuals view themselves based in part on 
how they compare themselves to those outside their group. “Membership of the group is 
important, but not as important as the relationship that emerges as the individual further 
defines themselves via comparison of a contrasting group known as the ‘out-group.”120  
Social physiological theories can further assist red teams in preventing some of 
the common errors associated with an analysis of terrorists. Table 2 lists some of the 
mindsets that can lead to errors in an analysis effort. Red teaming, with SIT factored in, 
can assist an analyst in avoiding some of these pitfalls. Identifying and understanding the 
underlying factors associated with another’s in-group, and out-groups can provide a red 
team analysis the ability to approach a problem set free of these more common errors. 
Table 2.   Common Analytical Bias121 
Bias Description  
Tunnel Vision Tendency to focus on a small portion of a 
much larger complex problem 
Over Optimism Assumption that success will occur 
Cultural Contempt Failure to recognize and assimilate 
importance of differing culture(s) 
Mirror Imaging Applying own attitudes and opinions to a 
third party 
Trends Faith Blind adherence to trends 
Paradigm Bias Aversion to address/change models that have 
worked in the past 
Current Focus Failure to anticipate or react 
 
SIT is a valuable tool for red team alternative analysis, which fills a void within 
many current approaches. “A comprehensive review of the literature suggests that a lack 
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of systematic scholarly investigation has left policy-makers to design counterterrorism 
strategies without the benefit of facts regarding the origin of terrorist behavior—or, 
worse, guided by theoretical presumption couched as facts.”122  
Red teaming is that specific set of alternative analysis techniques that is based in 
accounting for an adversary’s perspective. Knowledge of the psychology of an adversary 
is crucial to the development of red team functions, which if meeting requirements, 
provide a functional representation of an adaptive adversary.123  
This approach is value added to developing a red teaming system that truly 
conducts an alternative analysis from the point of view of the adversary. A system, based 
on social psychological model, “can provide Red Teams the needed insight of the target 
audience in order to formulate mindsets, perceptions, and bias that can be in turn 
quantified as a rule set that the team can then base further decisions.”124 With this 
knowledge and skill sets, red teams can better achieve their primary function to provide 
an alternative analysis to decision makers from the adversaries’ perspective. 
If executed correctly, red teaming can break the chain of analytical bias and in-
grouping traits among homeland security practitioners. A solid understanding of SIT and 
an approach that truly comes from an out-group’s point of view should be a key skill of a 
red team member, which is an excellent area for further research and examination.  
D. EXAMPLES OF RED TEAMS IN USE 
1. Homeland Security Red Teaming- Government of Canada 
The Government of Canada does not have a formal anti-terrorism red teaming 
program. However, Canada has utilized red teaming alternative analysis for major events, 
the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics being a recent example.125 During the planning 
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cycle for securing the Olympics, a team was designated specifically to challenge 
Canadian Forces’ (CF) conformity, convention, and orthodoxy in counterterrorism while 
encouraging “self-discovery and learning” within the ranks.126  
The team, known as the Games Red Team (GRT), was tasked with conducting an 
alternative analysis of the Olympic security plan with the goal of gaining an 
understanding of the high-end threat to the Games. To achieve this goal, the GRT 
developed an adversary campaign plan based on an imaginary terrorist cell with traits 
found in open source readings on terrorist groups worldwide.127 The team conducted an 
assessment of the terrorist actors’  devised scalable threat scenarios from the perspective 
of a potential adversary that spoke to specifically identified deficiencies in the CF’s 
Olympic plan. The GRT provided an independent peer review of defence planning.128 
This red teaming process has been identified as a best practice and incorporated into 
future large-scale security event planning efforts. 
2. Military Red Teaming—United Kingdom Ministry of Defense 
The United Kingdom does have an established red teaming program within its 
Ministry of Defense. Over the last couple of years, red teaming has become more widely 
used in UK defense planning, and is now recognized as a major aid to decision making in 
the planning and policy functions of defense.129 This concept of red teaming for defense 
is similar to that of the Government of Canada, and the United States. “Organisations 
establish red teams to challenge aspects of their own plans, programmes and assumptions. 
It is this aspect of deliberate challenge that distinguishes red teaming from other 
management tools, although there is not a sharp boundary between them.”130  
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3. Comparative Analysis of the U.S. Domestic Maritime Anti-Terrorism 
Programs 
The Canadian red teaming approach to the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics is a 
value added example for the U.S.’ homeland security event planning. The approach 
leveraged military officers and red team skill sets and applied them to a homeland 
security problem set.  
The approach was not without its issues. Buy in from law enforcement elements 
for the alternative analysis was problematic, primarily attributed to the military 
procedures and approach of the red team. The approach, however, is value added; being 
able to leverage defense personnel and skills to allow for an independent alternative 
analysis of homeland security plans and functions. Refinement of the processes to 
account for differences in approach and clients would add further validity and value to 
the red team process. 
Red teaming by the U.S. homeland security enterprise is not common. For 
example, red teaming processes were not used during the planning and development of 
the maritime security plan for the 2011 Asian Pacific Economic Committee conference. 
This event, hosted by the United States in Hawaii, was the first outside continental United 
States (OCONUS) national security special event.131 Each event venue, including the 
hotels housing over 20 heads of state, had direct maritime perimeters requiring security. 
Protective security operations were planned for this event utilizing standard methods and 
activities outlined in the Coast Guard MSRO manual. While deemed an efficient and 
effective plan at the time, an alternative analysis from an adversary’s point of view could 
have identified weaknesses in the plan along with potential countermeasures. The 
Canadian red team approach to the 2010 Vancouver Olympics provides a template for an 
alternative analysis of event security plans and could be adapted for use by the Coast 
Guard within the domestic maritime domain.  
The UK red team approach, while similar to the U.S. model, does differ in some 
areas. Within the UK model, a red team is formed with the objective of “subjecting an 
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organizations plans, programmes, ideas and assumptions to rigorous analysis and 
challenge.”132 The U.S. model differs from the UK’s model, as specific teams are 
established and tasked with separate functions. Teams are assigned in areas, such as 
conceptual challenge, wargaming, and technical terms that seek to find gaps and 
vulnerabilities within a plan. The UK model does not make these distinctions, with the 
red team identified as the group that addresses these alternative analysis processes as a 
whole. The UK approach for red teaming for defense could be adapted to meet red 
teaming needs within the domestic maritime domain. Using this overall system analysis 
approach shows merit, and would allow the Coast Guard to assess the ability of its 
programs and policy to address the risks of terrorism while also identifying future risk. 
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IV. DOMESTIC MARITIME DOMAIN TERRORISM RED TEAM 
PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Threats from terrorism persist and continue to evolve; attack methods are harder 
to identify and do not come from any one individual or group.133 It is critical that Coast 
Guard policy, plans, and tactics maintain pace with the ever-changing risks associated 
with terrorism. As both a military and federal law enforcement organization, the Coast 
Guard faces the broad challenges each of these organizational structures are afflicted with 
including  a lack of creativity for the sake of efficient execution.134 As with any human 
system, the organization is fallible; susceptible to beliefs, biases and constraints that may 
skew decision making and analysis.135 The domestic maritime security enterprise must 
account for this ever-changing environment and address the uncertainty, which frames 
anti-terrorism pragmatic decisions.136 
The Coast Guard’s domestic maritime anti-terrorism program is generally 
efficiently executed and managed. An alternative analysis point of view identifying future 
threat streams and gauging the domestic maritime security regime’s ability to address 
them would increase the ability of the Coast Guard to define and address terrorism risk. 
All decision makers and their teams are subject to bias, emotion, and the need to simplify 
complex problems by the use of assumptions and models.137 These realities lead policy 
developers to generally limit the problem sets they seek to address. Red teaming 
programs are designed to counter these inherent factors. Such a program within the 
domestic maritime domain would challenge current maritime security doctrine, identify 
potential weaknesses in anti-terrorism policy and plans, and offer solutions by which to 
lower the risks of a terrorist attack. 
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This chapter discusses and defines a proposed alternative analysis red teaming 
program executed by the Coast Guard in the mission space of domestic maritime 
terrorism. The paragraph discusses the domestic and international nexus of maritime 
terrorism, and defines the program elements.  
B. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TERRORISM AND PIRACY 
The global economy relies heavily on international maritime shipping to move 
goods and people around the world. As economic trends shift, so do the demands upon 
the maritime transportation system. An effective red teaming program must factor in 
global maritime security trends to provide value-added alternative analysis assessments.  
A trend in the literature has been establishing a linkage between international 
piracy and maritime terrorism. Somalia’s coastal waters have been at the center of much 
of this activity. While the motivation for most of these situations has been purely 
economical, the actions provide terrorists an excellent case study in target selection. That 
is to say, piracy activity has proven that large commercial vessels are highly vulnerable 
targets for terrorists.  
Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have shown both interest and a history 
of attacking large vessels, both commercial and military. In January 2000, al Qaeda 
attempted and failed to attack the USS SULLIVANS docked in Yemen via a boat bomb. 
Having learned from the first attempt, the organization successfully attacked the USS 
COLE in October of that year. In 2002, Al Qaeda attacked the French oil tanker 
LIMBURG, and during that same year, Moroccan officials disrupted an al Qaeda plot 
against British and American tankers in the Strait of Gibraltar.138 
Maritime terrorist attacks have not been limited to al Qaeda. In 2004, Abu Sayyaf 
conducted a bombing attack on a large ferry in the Philippines that sank the 
SUPERFERRY 14 and killed 116 people.139 This attack showed that an attack on a large 
passenger vessel has the potential for inflicting mass casualties in a single successful 
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attack. In 2009, Pakistani bureau chief, Syed Saleem Shahzad, reported that an emerging 
priority for al Qaeda was precisely the disruption and destabilization of sea routes 
between Somalia and Yemen,140 and in May 2009, al Qaeda issued direction to its 
followers to attack strategic maritime chokepoints as a way to destabilize the global 
economy.141 In July 2009, Egyptian authorities arrested over 20 individuals, which they 
claim were an al Qaeda cell. During the raid explosives, electronic devices, and diving 
equipment were seized. The men are charged with planning attacks on ships traveling 
within the Suez Canal.142 These maritime threats highlight the relevance of alternative 
analysis red teaming programs to identify potential attack methods and security 
programs’ ability to address maritime attacks  
A red teaming program could provide the current Coast Guard MSRAM 
quantitative data on the abilities of would-be terrorist actors within the domestic maritime 
domain, as well as identify potential future attack scenarios. Specifically, an alternative 
analysis program focusing on red teaming concepts to identify and define would be 
attackers’ abilities, and potential attack methods would directly support the current 
MSRAM process. Red teaming would reduce the Coast Guard MSRAM programs 
singular reliance on SME judgments for calculating would-be terrorists abilities, as well 
as integrating within the current risk assessment system vice replacing it. A third policy 
analysis component would round out a red teaming progam by assessing anti-terrorism 
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C. PROGRAM ELEMENTS 
The domestic maritime anti-terrorism red team program would be comprised of 
three components: 
• A physical red teaming component. This element identifies the capabilities 
of would-be attackers to conduct elements of a terrorist attack within the 
maritime domain. The program’s outputs would be quantifiable data 
elements  incorporated into the existing MSRAM program. 
• The identification of future attack scenarios. This element assesses 
emerging technologies and their potential application for terrorist attacks 
within the domestic maritime domain. The program’s outputs would 
include the descriptions of the technologies, application within the 
domestic maritime domain, and potential countermeasures. 
• A policy red teaming component. This element assesses the level which 
policy meets the strategic goals. Specifically, how Coast Guard domestic 
maritime anti-terrorism policies reduce the risk of terrorist attacks. 
1. Physical Attack Abilities  
This program assesses physical abilities of would-be terrorist actors within the 
domestic maritime domain. Following accepted steps in the development of a red 
teaming process, such as those identified by Sandia National Labs,143 both physical and 
virtual red teaming protocols provide a baseline and continual assessment of potential 
attackers’ ability to execute the various steps of identified attack scenarios. This 
assessment captures adversaries’ abilities to execute potential techniques, but not their  
intent. The program provides a continual update on potential attack methods, and 
identifies the possible use of new technologies and methods by would-be attackers. The 
assessment results are both qualitative and quantitative in nature and are transferable 
directly into the Coast Guard MSRAM risk analysis program. 
Table 3 provides a set of attack scenarios and methods for specific targets to 
assess an adversary’s abilities. 
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2. Future Attack Scenarios  
This program assesses emergent technologies, social constructs, and other factors 
to identify and capture data on future attack scenarios within the domestic maritime 
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domain, as shown in Table 4. This alternative analysis program provides value to the 
Coast Guard’s anti-terrorism program by providing an “examination of the tools and 
tactics available to terrorists, it is possible to establish intelligence profiles and threat 
indicators to warn of potential attacks and other operations.”145 This information is 
mostly qualitative in nature, and provides direction for the physical and policy red 
teaming programs. 
Table 4.   Future Scenarios Functions146 
Assessment Analysis 
Highlight unidentified Attacks 
Scenarios 
Insight into adversaries intentions, 
perceptions, and decision making 
methods 
Identification of future technologies 
potential exploitation by an adversaries 
Identification of adversaries alternative 
actions and responses to situations or 
inputs 
 
3. Policy Assessment 
This program assesses the Coast Guard’s policies ability to meet anti-terrorism 
goals and objectives. The program reviews policy to identify gaps and vulnerabilities 
from an adversarial perspective. An excellent example of such a program is the 2010 
2010 Winter Olympic Games efforts of the Government of Canda described previously. 
The efforts of the GRT offer an example of how to leverage red teaming in planning and 
policy development. Similar to the GRT program, a domestic maritime red teaming 
policy program focuses on “discovery learning”; an intellectual approach to analyze 
planning cycles, assumptions, and policy.147 In doing so, the policy red team seeks to 
“challenge … conformity, convention, and orthodoxy while encouraging self-discovery 
and learning”148 within the policy development ranks. 
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to Terrorist Attack” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 59. 
146 Developed by author, pre-decisional information, October 2015 
147 Wilner, “Terrorism in Canada: Victims and Perpetrators,” 93. 
148 Ibid. 
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Applying alternative analysis techniques to security planning helps identify 
atypical threats, exemplified by 9/11, and allows analysts and decision makers to stretch 
their understanding of emerging threat environments.149 Playing Devil’s advocate is a 
form of red teaming derived from alternative analysis well suited for policy assessment, 
as presented in Table 5. Devil’s advocate techniques include “critiques of, and in some 
cases alternatives to, the enterprise’s assumptions, strategies, plans, concepts, programs, 
projects, and processes. At the program level, the objective of this type of red team is to 
provide critical analysis in order to anticipate problems and avoid surprises.”150 
Table 5.   Policy Red Teaming Functions151 
Alternative Policy Review Alternative Analysis 
Existing Policies Problem Sets 
Developmental Policies Metrics 
Doctrine Trends 
 Effectiveness Standards 
 
  
                                                 
149 Fishbein and Treverton, “Rethinking “Alternative Analysis” to Address Transnational Threats,” 2–
3.  
150 Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, The Role and 
Status of DOD Red Teaming Activities, 4. 
151 Developed by author, pre-decisional information. 
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V. IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS 
A. MINIMAL VIABLE PROGRAM FOR GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
In business terms, a startup is described as “a human institution designed to create 
a new product or service under conditions of extreme uncertainty.”152 A key component 
within the startup framework is a minimal viable product. “A Minimum Viable Product is 
that version of a new product which allows a team to collect the maximum amount of 
validated learning about customers with the least effort.”153 In other terms, a minimum 
viable product is “the smallest thing you can build that delivers customer value (and as a 
bonus captures some of that value back).”154 Another trait of a startup is 
entrepreneurship. “Anyone who is creating a new product or business under conditions of 
extreme uncertainty is an entrepreneur whether he or she knows it or not and whether 
working in a government agency, a venture-backed company, a nonprofit, or a decidedly 
for-profit company with financial investors.”155  
Startup concepts can apply to government as well. Policy development can be 
executed in a similar manner. Terms, such as beta testing or pilot programs, are 
commonly used, and are in fact, examples of startup approaches within federal 
government. As policies and programs are generally the core products government 
agencies produce, it is suggested in this thesis that the product of a startup in the federal 
government can be described as a minimal viable program. The author defines a 
minimum viable program as the collection of initial policy, TTP, and tools entered into a 
learning loop to establish a program, while improving and developing its elements to 
meet the strategic objective(s) of an agency. 
                                                 
152 Ries, The Lean Startup: How Today’s Entrepreneurs use Continuous Innovation to Create 
Radically Successful Businesses, 26. 
153 Ibid., 70. 
154 Maurya, “Minimum Viable Product.” 
155 Ries, The Lean Startup: How Today’s Entrepreneurs use Continuous Innovation to Create 
Radically Successful Businesses, 27. 
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The Coast Guard recently developed a policy in such a manner,  developing and 
deploying what is known as risk based maritime security response operations 
(RBMSRO). The program updated existing policy and tools, and transitioned domestic 
maritime security activity requirements to a risk-based planning and reporting program 
for domestic maritime anti-terrorism efforts. 
The program was run as a government startup; a small development team with a 
minimal budget developed an experimental policy and a prototype planning and reporting 
tool. The program was tested at a handful of seaports, took input, and adjusted both 
policy and the tool over the course of 12 months. The system was continuously evaluated 
and updated during the process, with an end result of having the program up and running 
at every seaport, and across the Coast Guard within 12 months of starting. Results and 
development were encouraging, and built a basis for risk-based resource management 
with an approach flexible enough to transition to other mission spaces. 
The 12-months period acted as both a development cycle and proof of concept. 
The policy and tool won acceptance and funded. It is currently undergoing an integration 
phase leading to becoming the Coast Guard program of record for maritime anti-terrorism 
programs. This minimal viable program approach could be replicated with other 
programs, including the alternative analysis red teaming concepts proposed in this thesis.  
Using RBMSRO implementation as an example, a maritime security alternative 
analysis red team program can be implemented via a minimal viable program approach. 
This approach allows for rapid implementation, scalability, and the ability to react and 
pivot to meet new demands and challenges. The following paragraphs discuss some 
challenges and proposed solutions for implementing an alternative analysis red teaming 
program for the domestic maritime domain. 
B. CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING A DOMESTIC MARITIME 
ANTI-TERRORISM RED TEAMING PROGRAM  
Programs must be nurtured to survive within the bureaucracy of the federal 
government. A program leader must have the skills and knowledge to maneuver with and 
through government circles and protocols to ensure success. This chapter discusses some 
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of challenges and opportunities in implementing a domestic maritime anti-terrorism red 
team program.  
In a democratic system, it simply is not possible to pay off a select few people to 
ensure they remain in power. Rather, it is essential to keep a larger population’s favor; 
normally, by the development of good and popular public policy.156 The proposed set of 
programs within this thesis will depend on two groups of people to “remain in power.” 
The first is the existing domestic maritime terrorism risk analysis enterprise currently in 
place within the Coast Guard. Moreover, the second is the senior leadership who make up 
the “ruling coalition”157 of the Coast Guard.  
Leaders will be dependent on the first group to execute and continue to develop 
the program. Their willingness to do so depends on two factors, first that the program 
provides value to the existing terrorism risk analysis construct, and secondly, that the 
program is supported by senior leadership (the identified second group). Senior Coast 
Guard leadership, the second group, will support this program if it provides a cost 
effective means to articulate the threats of terrorism within the domestic maritime 
domain. 
Of concern is the relatively small pool of people upon which the program will be 
dependent. The group of people who work within the current terrorism risk analysis 
enterprise is relatively small when compared to other Coast Guard programs. 
Additionally, the group of senior leaders who directly influence these programs is 
relatively small as well. To offset the associated risks, the program must focus on 
expanding the pool of supporters from senior leaders Coast Guard-wide. 
To implement and sustain the proposed set of red teaming programs, it will be 
important to have those working within, and customers of Coast Guard terrorism risk 
analysis, dependent upon these red teaming programs. To accomplish this dependency, 
                                                 
156 Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is 
Almost Always Good Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 41.  
157 Diana T. Richards et al., “Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force a Tale of 
Some Not-So-Free Agents,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 3 (1993): 504–535. 
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the programs must provide some early “wins” by showing unique perspectives in the 
arena of terrorism risk analysis. 
As compared to other programs, Coast Guard terrorism risk assessment and 
mission policy development does not have a large budget. However, anti-terrorism 
activities equate to about 1/3 of all Coast Guard resource hours, which are allocated 
across 11 mission areas.158 Providing value-added information upon which to base 
budgetary and policy decisions will encourage senior leaders from across the 
organization to support red teaming programs. Those involved in the programs are “paid” 
when leadership values their analysis, and bases organization-wide decisions upon it. 
Currency by which to “pay off” those who will keep this program in power, or even 
started, is in providing a value added alternative assessment that supports senior leader 
decision making.  
Having a set of programs that define terrorist abilities, identify potential future 
risks, and evaluate current policy from an adversaries’ point of view are powerful tools 
for senior level decision making. It will be imperative for these red teaming programs to 
focus on providing unique, value-added analysis that cannot otherwise be provided by 
existing programs. It will both strengthen the programs’ value, as well as narrow the 
number of elements they are dependent upon to remain viable.  
For such a program to be sucessful, it must leverage support from a wide-ranging 
group, or the “nominal selecotate pool.”159 According to De Mesquita, leaders must 
identify those within this pool whose support is truly influential. A leader, organization, 
or program is dependent upon various groups to remain sucessful. “A simple way to think 
of these groups is: interchangeables, influentials, and essentials.”160  
The interchangeables for the proposed red team programs are the Coast Guard 
program managers associated with anti-terrorism policy management. The influentials are 
made up of the office chiefs in these policy areas; namely, the Office of Maritime 
                                                 
158 Derived from author’s policy development research. 
159 Bueno De Mesquita and Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always 
Good Politics, 4–5. 
160 Ibid. 
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Security Response Policy, and the Office of Port Security Assessment. Finally, the 
essentials are the senior leaders who have oversight in anti-terrorism efforts. 
The set of red team programs this thesis proposes will provide value-added 
analysis to a wide Coast Guard audience. Current terrorism risk analysts will benefit from 
qualitative and quantitative assessments of terrorist abilities within the domestic maritime 
domain, and future attack scenarios. Senior leadership will likewise benefit from those 
programs’ input to the decision-making processes. Additionally, the entire organization 
will benefit from a policy of the red teams’ ability to identify weaknesses in the policies’ 
abilities to meet the goals of the organization.  
A “winning coalition” for Coast Guard terrorism red teaming would be comprised 
of elements across the organization. Red team programs would be ingrained into the 
Coast Guard terrorism risk enterprise, with red team analysis interwoven into decisions 
regarding attack scenarios and target selection. Senior leadership would be dependent 
upon, and factor in, red team analysis into policy, budget, and acquisition decisions for 
the organization. 
Many companies have failed when “confronted with disruptive changes in 
technology and market structure.”161 At its core, red teaming provides analysis to inform 
senior leaders of potential, or normally, unseen disruptive events. Additionally, red team 
programs must be able to detect and account for disruptive trends that could threaten their 
viability in an organization. To remain worthwhile, red team programs must strive to 
provide analysis that is functionally valuable and digestible by the decision-making 
mechanisms of an organization, including the approaches of senior leadership. 
In conclusion, the red team programs the author has proposed within this thesis 
can provide value-added analysis to the Coast Guard. To succeed, and remain of value, 
these programs must be integrated into the existing Coast Guard terrorism risk analysis 
enterprise, provide digestible analysis to senior leadership, and support the overall goals 
                                                 
161 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: The Revolutionary Book that Will Change the 
Way You Do Business (New York: Collins Business Essentials, 1997), 2. 
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of the organization. Failure to achieve and sustain these efforts would put considerable 
strain on a red team analysis system to remain a viable program within the Coast Guard. 
1. Potential Road Blocks to Implementation 
Two groups have been identified as potential inhibitors to the implementation of 
the programs. The first is described as the “status quo” group. These individuals, many of 
them long-time employees, generally consider the current terrorism risk analysis 
constructs within the Coast Guard meet the current analysis demand. They generally 
focus on efforts that add controls and management oversight elements to existing 
programs.  
The second group is identified as the “legacy mission” group. These individuals 
place little value on programs that are not part of the suite of Coast Guard “pre-DHS” 
missions. They would view a terrorism red team analysis program as just another 
unneeded effort within the organization. They generally focus on efforts that expand 
upon the Coast Guard’s non-homeland security missions. 
2. Program Support 
The USCG Commandant’s strategic intent for 2015–2019 states, “Risk 
management and hazard prevention across the Maritime Transportation System (MTS) 
will remain essential to accomplishing our objectives of safety and security.”162 An 
alternative analysis red teaming program would directly support this approach and 
directly support one of the Commandant’s strategic intents. Program alignment with 
leadership strategic intent drives support for the programs at the highest levels of the 
organization. These facts point to the two primarily policy development offices within the 
Coast Guard Headquarters, the Office of Response Policy, and the Office of Prevention 
Policy as the primary supporters for these programs. 
The most direct means by which to offset potential roadblocks to successful 
acceptance of the programs is to produce early gains by providing an early on value 
                                                 
162 United States Coast Guard, Commandant’s Strategic Intent 2015–2019 (Washington, DC: United 
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added alternative analysis that contributes to senior leadership decision making. Annual 
budget decisions and resource allocation are two primary areas in which these early wins 
could be accomplished within the annual planning cycle. 
To support these decisions, the Coast Guard must have in place a suite of 
accepted risk assessment and analysis programs. As a fellow maritime security 
professional once stated and often continues to state, “In the absence of emotion and 
political influence, risk is where risk is.”163 Alternative assessment, in the form of red 
teaming, is a missing component within the Coast Guard’s terrorism risk assessment and 
analysis programs. “The key to security, domestic or otherwise, is the continuous 
evaluation of the security environment while mitigating the risk of the decisions made to 
counter threats.”164  
C. LOGISTICS OF IMPLEMENTATION  
It is proposed in this thesis that the current domestic maritime anti-terrorism 
analysis and policy directorates within the Coast Guard would execute each of the 
elements of a domestic maritime anti-terrorism red teaming program, as seen in Table 6. 
Red teaming cycles would be annual, and align with current terrorism risk assessment 
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Table 6.   Proposed Coast Guard Domestic Maritime Anti-Terrorism Red 
Teaming Programs165 




Office of International & 
Domestic Port 
Assessment 
Qualitative and Quantitative 
injects into MSRAM 
Medium effort now new 






Qualitative and Quantitative 
injects into threat reporting and 
MSRAM 
Medium effort now new 




Office of Strategic 
Analysis 
Annual assessment of domestic 
maritime anti-terrorism policy 
Significant effort 2–3 
years new structure 
needed 
 
The physical red teaming program could be implemented by leveraging existing 
terrorism risk analysis structure within the Coast Guard, as well as leveraging local, 
regional, and headquarters risk assessment staffs. Led by The Office of International & 
Domestic Port Assessment, it is envisioned that the program would be managed by PSA-
2, which executes the MSRAM program for the Coast Guard. 
Likewise, the future attack scenario red teaming program could leverage existing 
terrorism risk analysis structure within the Coast Guard; specifically, the ICC. The 
program would integrate into the ICC’s annual MSRAM threat data processes and align 
efforts along the existing annual assessment cycles. As a new concept, the policy red 
team program would need further study to define its position in the organization. It is 
suggested that the program be established within the Coast Guard Office of Strategic 
Analysis. 
D. USE OF COAST GUARD CADETS FOR RED TEAMING 
To further leverage current Coast Guard resources, this thesis examines the use of 
Coast Guard Academy Cadets within the proposed alternative analysis red team programs 
as both red teaming members and program developers. The Coast Guard Academy is the 
only service academy with direct linkages to homeland security and resides within a 
                                                 
165 Developed by author, pre-decisional information. 
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component of the DHS. “The Coast Guard Academy is also the only U.S. service 
academy with focused coursework and a continuum in Strategic Intelligence Studies.”166 
Uniquely positioned, this institution can support Coast Guard red teaming programs and 
establish itself as the DHS red teaming center of excellence.  
The study of alternative analysis red teaming, matched with the actual red 
teaming programs discussed within this thesis, would provide the Coast Guard, and DHS 
overall, with a value added program currently missing within the area of domestic 
maritime security. Inserting this course of study into the Coast Guard Academy has the 
added benefit of providing a steady stream of skilled officers with red teaming skill sets 
to the homeland security enterprise. A precedence does exist for the Coast Guard 
Academy educational program to provide value to and address Coast Guard challenges 
and efforts in the field. Coast Guard Academy operations research capstone project 
programs,167 strategic intelligence studies,168 and government security studies 
concentration are all areas of study with direct linkages to an alternative analysis red 
teaming concepts.  
The Coast Guard should consider the continuous pool Academy Cadets as red 
teaming elements. This untapped resource represents a useful demographic of technology 
savvy individuals with basic maritime skill sets. By leveraging current risk assessment 
and analysis processes and incorporating Coast Guard Academy cadets as red teaming 
subjects, this program has the potential for the establishment with a minimal additional 
expenditure of funds of a homeland security center of excellence in an area of analysis 
that currently is nonexistent. This subject merits further research. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The domestic maritime domain is a complex system of transportation, recreation, 
and essential services linked by the waters of the United States. This operational domain 
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can benefit from an alternative analysis red teaming program. “Red teaming is a white 
light that takes on various characteristics as it shines through the prism of different 
organizations.”169 Understanding the terrorist risk within the domestic maritime domain, 
through the eyes of those who would do harm is value added. “Successful red teaming 
offers a hedge against surprise and inexperience and a guard against complacency. It tests 
the fusion of policy, operations, and intelligence.”170  
For the Coast Guard, red teaming can directly support the organization’s existing 
terrorism risk analysis enterprise with qualitative and quantitative assessments of 
terrorists physical attack abilities in the domestic maritime domain. Red teaming can 
further support risk analysis and policy development by identifying previously 
unidentified and future attack scenarios. Red teaming can further provide value by 
providing an analysis of current and under development policy from the adversarial point 
of view. “By using the red team concept, enterprises can draw on the perspective of the 
adversary to challenge their assumptions and their countermeasures.”171  
Doctrine, practices, and procedures for providing homeland defense and security 
are based upon science and analysis, “however, Defence (and security) is an organization 
founded on a set of people with a specific culture, and way of thinking and operating.”172 
These foundations are powerful management tools. However, as discussed, they can also 
blind an organization to potentially hazardous risks. As stated by Sun Tzu, “…if ignorant 
of both your enemy and yourself you are bound to be in peril….”173 
To support these decisions, agencies must have in place adequate and accepted 
risk assessment and analysis programs. As a fellow maritime security professional once 
stated and often continues to state, “In the absence of emotion and political influence, risk 
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is where risk is.”174 Decision makers must take into account the risks associated with 
terrorism and base their actions upon those risks despite the political and other pressures 
aimed at them. This charge is placed upon homeland security professionals. “The key to 
security, domestic or otherwise, is the continuous evaluation of the security environment 
while mitigating the risk of the decisions made to counter threats.”175 
The research conducted for this thesis highlights a role for social identity theory 
in red teaming. It can be leveraged to define functions of red teaming, as well as assist in 
the avoidance of some of the more common pitfalls and biases of analysts. This subject 
warrants further research and development. 
It is recommended that an alternative analysis program red teaming program be 
established within the Coast Guard. The program elements should define would-be 
attacker abilities and potential attack methods. The output of these programs are 
structured to allow for direct incorporation into the Coast Guard MSRAM terrorism risk 
assessment program. As the lead federal maritime security agency, the Coast Guard is the 
ideal organization to lead and manage this program. Leveraging its regulatory authorities, 
as well as its responsibilities within the maritime transportation sub-sector, the Coast 
Guard has the authorities and responsibility to execute such a program.176 
It is envisioned that this program would include two types of red teaming 
approaches, analytical and physical. The analytical focuses upon an alternative analysis 
of policies and programs, while the physical focuses its efforts on the tactics and 
techniques of terrorist actors within the domestic maritime domain. The domestic 
maritime security red teaming program described in this thesis should be integrated with 
the existing Coast Guard intelligence and terrorism risk assessment and analysis 
programs to support senior decision makers and maritime security policy developers. 
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Through this red team program, Coast Guard anti-terrorism programs will continue to 
evolve and keep pace with future threats to the domestic maritime domain. 
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